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Treating the fee as income of Hilda’s employer is
sometimes referred to as the agency exception to the
anticipatory assignment doctrine.8 There is no indi-
cation that the IRS has ever attempted to tax an
agent in that circumstance. Indeed, the exclusion
from an agent’s income of amounts received for
services performed for clients was acknowledged
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v.
Earl.9
The anticipatory assignment doctrine can arise in
connection with an assignment to a qualified char-
ity, and the agency exception operates there as well.
For example, Patricia, a prominent actress, wished
to make a gift to the Beth El Temple, a qualified
charity. She was offered a position to perform on a
television production for a fee of $250,000. She
required as a condition to her accepting the position
that the fee be paid to the Beth El Temple, and the
producer did so. Because Patricia’s services were
the source of the payment, Patricia must include it
in her income under the anticipatory assignment
doctrine.10
Let us change the facts of that illustration. The
Beth El Temple decided to produce a television
show and asked Patricia to perform in the produc-
tion. While her usual fee is $250,000, she agreed to
perform for no compensation. The tax law does not
treat that transaction as a constructive payment to
her, and so she will report no income from the
transaction.11
Take another example. Roger volunteered to
serve as the supervisory attorney for students en-
gaged in a clinical course at the Piedmont Law
School. In that capacity, Roger worked on a legal
issue for a client of the clinic’s, and the client paid
him a fee for his services and for the services of the
law students who worked with him on the matter.
Under his arrangement with the law school, Roger
turned the fee over to Piedmont. Because Roger and
the law students were serving as agents of the law
school in earning the fee, the fee is not taxable to
him or to the students, but rather is the income of
the law school.12 If Roger and the students had not
qualified as agents of the law school, the fee would
have been taxable to them under the anticipatory
assignment doctrine.
The IRS and the courts have placed a heavy
burden on a taxpayer to prove that he was acting as
the agent of a charity; therefore, strong evidence of
an agency relationship will be required.13 The ques-
tion whether an agency relationship exists fre-
quently arises in the context of a member of a
religious organization who has taken a vow of
poverty and turns over any fees he earns to the
religious organization. If the fees were for services
provided to an unrelated entity, the fees would be
taxable to the member unless it can be shown that
the religious organization itself was engaged to
provide the services so that the member was acting
on its behalf.14
While the existence of an agency exception is
indisputable, there has been no explanation of why
it exists and what tax principle justifies it. Without
knowledge of the justification for the exception, it is
difficult to understand why it is not applied more
broadly. For example, why was the husband in
Lucas v. Earl not acting as an agent of his wife and
why is the priest who made a vow of poverty not an
agent of his order when he performs services for an
unrelated entity? The answer is found by determin-
ing the principle on which the agency exception is
grounded.
To determine that underlying principle, it is
necessary first to consider the operation of a differ-
ent doctrine: the anticipation of income doctrine.
This doctrine possesses some of the same elements
as the anticipatory assignment doctrine and shares
a somewhat similar designation. Unfortunately, the
courts sometimes conflate the two doctrines and
cite cases dealing with one of the doctrines in a case
involving the other. However, the two doctrines do
operate together in one important respect. Before
considering that interaction, let us examine the
anticipation of income doctrine and distinguish it
from the anticipatory assignment doctrine.
An anticipatory assignment is a transfer of the
right to future income for which no consideration is
received in exchange. An anticipation of income is a
transfer of the right to future income in exchange
for which consideration is received. A transaction
8See the dissenting opinion of Judge James Halpern in
Schneer v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 643 (1981).
9O.D. 119, 1 C.B. 82 (1919). See also Maryland Casualty Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920).
10Reg. section 1.61-2(c). Patricia will be allowed to claim a
deduction for the amount paid to the temple as a contribution to
a qualified charity subject to the limitations on deductibility
under section 170.
11Reg. section 1.61-2(c).
12Rev. Rul. 74-581, 1974-2 C.B. 25. Of course, the law school
likely is a tax-exempt entity.
13See, e.g., Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir.
1986); Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26. See also Douglas A. Kahn
and Jeffrey H. Kahn, Federal Income Tax, para. 14.2380 (2011).
14Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26; McEneany v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1986-413.
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can be part anticipatory assignment and part antici-
pation of income if consideration that is received is
less than the value of the income interest that was
transferred.
One consequence of an anticipation of income
transaction is that the consideration that the trans-
feror receives is treated as ordinary income.15 A
second consequence is that when the future income
that was the subject of the transfer is recognized, it
will be income to the transferee, who purchased it,
and not to the transferor.16 Because the transferor
sold the right to that income in an arm’s-length
transaction, he will not be taxed on its subsequent
recognition.
For example, in year 1, Paula was the income
beneficiary of a trust, which provides that she is to
receive the income from the trust for 20 years. In
year 1, Paula needed a large amount of cash, and so
she sold to Mark, an unrelated party, the right to
income from the trust for the next five years. The
amount that Mark paid Paula was equal to the
present value of the right to the trust’s income for
the next five years. The amount that Paula received
from Mark is ordinary income to her in year 1. The
trust income that is payable to Mark in each of the
five years is included in Mark’s taxable income and
not in Paula’s. Mark can amortize his cost over the
five-year period. Because Paula sold her right to the
five years of income, the anticipatory assignment
doctrine does not cause her to be taxed on that
income when it is earned. In other words, the
application of the anticipation of income doctrine
negates the application of the anticipatory assign-
ment doctrine to that transaction.
The same treatment should apply to the sale of
the right to income from services when the sale is
made at arm’s length. The amount realized will be
treated as ordinary income in the year of receipt,
and the subsequent income produced by the seller
and purchased by the buyer will be taxable to the
buyer and not to the seller. The seller received the
present value of the income stream that he antici-
pates producing, and so is not taxed again when
that income is earned.
That treatment explains the justification for the
agency exception. The principal purchased the right
to use the services of the agent to produce income
for the principal. Any amount paid to the agent by
the principal for the right to use the agent’s services
(that is, wages) is ordinary income to the agent in
the year received or accrued. Any income earned
from the agent’s services is included in the princi-
pal’s taxable income. The principal can deduct
whatever it paid to the agent to purchase the use of
his services.
Concededly, the anticipation of income doctrine
is not expressly applicable to the case of hiring an
agent. However, the circumstances are similar to
those to which the doctrine does apply, and the
principles underlying that doctrine apply with
equal force to the circumstances of the agency
relationship.
How does this help distinguish those circum-
stances when persons who took a vow of poverty
are not taxed on the income they produced from
those that are taxed? If the principal uses the agent
to perform services for a business or activity con-
ducted by the principal, it is using the services
whose use it purchased. Consequently, the income
produced by the agent is not taxable to the agent.
But if the agent performs services that are not under
a service that the principal is required to provide to
that entity, the agent is merely assigning the income
he earns to his religious organization and is not
acting as their agent. In other words, the services
performed by the agent are not services the use of
which had been purchased by the principal.
In most of the cases involving a member of a
religious organization who took a vow of poverty,
the religious organization pays a stipend to the
member, and so the situation is similar to that of an
ordinary employee. What if, instead, someone
chooses to volunteer to act as an agent for an
organization without receiving any compensation?
Can the organization be deemed to have ‘‘pur-
chased’’ the right to the services of that volunteer? If
the volunteer donates his services to an organiza-
tion in which the volunteer owns no interest and
has no personal relationship, the organization can
be seen as having constructively purchased the
volunteer’s services and having received a con-
structive gift of an amount equal to the value of
those services. If there is a personal relationship
between the volunteer and the purported principal
(such as the relationship between a husband and a
wife, a parent and a child, or a corporation and a
shareholder), there is reason to doubt that there is a
true agency relationship, and not just a facade that
disguises an anticipatory assignment. While there
could be situations in which a true agency relation-
ship is intended, those would be rare, and the
difficulty in establishing their existence warrants
15E.g., Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Commissioner
v. P.G. Lake Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
16Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir.
1973). The transferee can amortize the amount paid for the right
to the income to offset some of its receipt.
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